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A Kaleidoscope of Justice. By John H. Wigmore.* Washington: Washington Law
Book Co., 1941. Pp. Xxx, 751. $5.00.
The title given above may be called "the short title." More fully the title is "A
Kaleidoscope of Justice Containing Authentic Accounts of Trial Scenes from All Times
and Places." There are, it is announced, one hundred and forty-two of these accounts
-there are really a great many more-and they describe the methods used all over the
world since the dawn of history to perform a special function called "justice." But,
as Dean Wigmore warns us, it is not the social and moral concept of justice. This
social and moral concept is a complex of ideas and institutions, and within it there
is one particular element concerned with public order. That is the element which
furnishes the background of most of the scenes so vividly described here. It is "jus-
tice" on a fairly simple level, the level of persons who are in fear of men that disturb
the social harmony and who wish to see them punished-which, in many cases, means
"removed altogether." It is the justice which gets itself frequently symbolized by
the sword, the fasces, or the gallows.
Justice in this sense has two goals. The first is to find out the disturber of the social
harmony-often subsumed under the term "peace," as in medieval Europe-and next
to get rid of him and, in addition, to frighten off others from similar attempts. We
have here more than one hundred and forty-two different illustrations of how different
communities have endeavored to perform this task.
Dean Wigmore goes through the five continents and concludes with eighteen ex-
amples from ancient times. His final chapter, or "Epilogue," analyzes what he finds
to be the basic elements in this justice. He finds a basic pattern-entertainingly illus-
trated in bright colors on the frontispiece-which shifts as we go from place to place,
without destroying the fundamental relationship. There is always a "power-holder,"
an accuser, a seizure of the accused, and some form of "proof," to which must be added
formal announcement of a judgment. Widely as these elements differ in detail, they
can be distinguished in every instance.
And what certainly can be learned from all these manifold and diverse efforts is the
fact that they are dreadfully ineffective. How often was the offender discovered? We
are prone to accept the common statement that, given the psychological conditions
of early times, ordeals, oaths, compurgators, and such things worked better than they
might on rational grounds be supposed to have worked, and that at the present time
witnesses and juries, or the shrewd intuitions of experienced judges, manage to be
right in most instances.
We can, however, scarcely conceal from ourselves that this is a pious hope rather
than a demonstrated fact, even in a system which, like ours, seeks some semblance of a
scientific investigation. Perhaps the laws of chance help out, but the numerous ex-
amples of obvious failure which these trials exhibit must give us pause.
* Dean Emeritus and Lecturer on Comparative Law, Northwestern University.
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Then there is the fact that they all-the modem scientific ones as well as the un-
scientific ones, whether the latter are primitive or ancient or frontier-quickly degen-
erate into machinery, and, being machinery, can be diverted to the oppression of the
weak as well as the enforcement of order. It is a matter about which we apparently
can do nothing, since safeguards against such diversion merely stimulate the ingenuity
of those who have control of the machinery to evade the safeguards. -Our only recourse
is to make sure that we know who are given control of the machinery.
If we really had to depend wholly on these methods to secure even the special ele-
ment of justice involved in public order-not the highest justice though it has often
called itself so-it would be a sorry kind of world in which to live. But the fact is
that we do not depend on them. Trials and procedures arise only when the great mass
of the community have already developed a social pattern and when divergences
from it are rare. Whenever these devices have to be used often, their tragic inefficacy
becomes so quickly apparent that a demand for revision and reform is inevitable.
That so many of these trial procedures have a marked association with wizardry and
magic is intelligible enough. They seek what is in effect an impossible thing to know,
something done, as Bracton said, izullo praesente, nullo sciente, rullo audiente, -ndlo
vidente.x The Danish and Norman conquerors of England made no attempt, as we
'know, to do this impossible thing when a man of their own was found dead, but the
method they used in place of a trial of fact was no more effective to prevent secret
killings than any other would have been.
And because procedure is associated with a ritual that inclines to magic, these ac-
counts-most of them by eye-witnesses-make just the kind of highly entertaining
reading that Dean Wigmore promises us.2 Only a person with the varied and wide
reading of the editor could have found all these cases for us. Only a person like Dean
Wigmore would have thought of collecting them or of presenting them in this pene-
trating fashion. We are never allowed to forget the common elements of the human
task performed by this shifting kaleidoscope of beheadings and floggings, strange adjura-
tions and incantations, searching interrogations and ingenious traps. Kafir and Fiji,
Teuton and Roman and Indian-all have the same thing in view and all are quite sure
they know how to reach it.
Numerous as these cases are, they are a selection, since the editor's source is as long
as recorded history and as wide as the habitable globe. Inevitably, some will miss
cases with which they are familiar and situations which they find more significant. I
doubt whether any other selection would have served so well to epitomize the episode
in social history which is involved here. The book is unique and of permanent value.
My single serious criticism would be directed to the inclusion of Number 173 and
Number 146.4 Dean Wigmore explains the use of these imaginative reconstructions
in place of authentic accounts. I am afraid I am not quite, convinced. There exist
manorial records of the Middle Ages and historical sources of the later Roman Empire,
which, while less complete, would have given us accounts more suitable for inclusion
in a collection like this.
x De Legibus f. i34a (Woodbine ed. 1922).
2P. v.
3 France: A Baronial Court of High, Middle, and Low Justice, A.D. 1220.
4 Rome: A Trial for Murder at Rome, A.D. 200.
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The editor disclaims any effort at precision of scholarly references. It will therefore
not be amiss to note that the Lateran Council of 1215 did not merely abolish the use
of the ordeals in Church courts5 but forbade priests to take part in ordeals anywhere.
As the priest's blessing was essential, this would of itself have ended the practice if
the orders had been rigorously carried out. They were not, as a matter of fact, and
Dean Wigmore notes that the ordeals lingered on in various parts of Christian Eu-
rope in spite of the Council.
Dean Wigmore, besides the enormous debt which the common law owes him for his
epoch-making work in Evidence, has a special claim on the gratitude of American
lawyers for his services in the field of Comparative Law, of which the present work is
a special and monumental illustration. He has domesticated among us the tradition
of Kohler and Vinogradoff rather than the severely practical type of research in which
Edouard Lambert's Institute at Lyons has done such notable work. It is in keeping
with his general attitude that he has cultivated this field for its value in promoting a
more profound understanding of law, by making its base as broad as possible. '"aw
is not so dull a subject as some men would have it," said Mr. Henry Parker of Lincoln's
Inn in x647, answering the royalist contentions of Judge Jenkins. Certainly, as Wig-
more conceives the law and presents it in this book, it is not dull from any point of view.
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The Rights of Margin Customers against Wrongdoing Stockbrokers and Some Other
Problems in the Modem Law of Pledge. By Edward H. Warren.* Norwood, Mass.:
The Plimpton Press, i941. Pp. xiv, 464. $4.00.
Professor Warren's stated purpose in writing this book is to build a modem law of
pledge based upon . ... . a juristic structure with foundations as solid, and with lines
as simple and stately and with vistas as spacious as those befitting a colonial mansion."
If these remarks are meant to be read somewhat literally and are not afforded the im-
munity of poetic license, one is inclined to question both the attainability of the
author's objective in the workings of the judicial process and the underlying assump-
tions of the legal scholar who believes changing and conflicting needs and. interests in a
work-a-day world can be satisfactorily accommodated in a logical structure designed to
fit all situations in which lawyers invoke the collection of legal rules sometimes as-
sembled under the caption, "The Modem Law of Pledge."
The execution of the author's objective has given us a repository of much valuable
legal information, as well as such miscellany as seven rules for careful writing and the
fact that the preparation of the book consumed 450 hours, at 15 hours a week for 30
weeks. The subject of the book purports to have been selected as best illustrating the
delinquency of judges in not developing and changing the law, in not making it more
consonant with the conceptions of businessmen, and in not writing clearer, better
reasoned opinions. Thefoundation for the criticism of judicial decision is laid scholar-like
by tracing the law of pledge from the time of the first treatise on common law that has
come down to us, Ranulf de Glanville's Laws and Cstoms of the Kingdom of England,
in the year xx8x.
sP. 6.
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